

Giving Voice beyond Her Vote: How Women Used Charitable Giving to Create Social Change after the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election

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Introduction

Political elections provide an opportunity for Americans to shape public policy and make their voices heard. The 2016 U.S. presidential election was unique—and divisive—in many ways. With a major political party putting forth a female candidate for the first time and contentious issues that affect women being widely discussed, gender played a key role in the campaign. Exit polls showed the widest gender gap in voting in recent decades—men favored Republican Donald Trump by a 12 percentage-point margin, while women preferred Democrat Hillary Clinton by the same margin. Following the election, unprecedented numbers of people joined social movements such as the Women’s March, which addressed gender equality and reproductive rights, among other topics perceived as being under threat by the incoming administration.

This study investigates changes in charitable giving around the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The paper uses daily transaction data from an online donation platform during the time period immediately leading up to and following the election. Importantly, the paper also explores gender differences in giving around the election, since research demonstrates that women and men exhibit varying patterns in their philanthropy and are motivated to donate by different factors.ⁱ The study finds that, overall, charitable giving was lower than expected immediately following the 2016 presidential election, especially among men. However, following the election, donations to progressive-leaning nonprofits directly connected to issues raised during the 2016 election campaign significantly increased. This increase in charitable giving to relevant progressive nonprofits was primarily driven by women donors. The results provide helpful insight for scholars and fundraising practitioners, regarding how donors—particularly women—may express their values through giving during political events.

This study contributes to a growing body of literature on the economic and social outcomes of political events (Dolan, 2006; Białkowski, Gottschalk, Wisniewski, 2008). It also provides empirical evidence to supplement anecdotal reports that nonprofit organizations experienced a substantial increase in donations following the 2016 U.S. presidential election (Financial Times, 2018). The popular media referred to this phenomenon as “rage giving”—the concept of donors giving to charity in response to the outcome of the election, often to causes that had been debated during the campaign, including minority rights, immigrant rights, and climate change.ⁱⁱ While

ⁱ See for example: Mesch, D.J., Brown, M.S., Moore, Z.I., & Hayat, A.D. (2011). Gender Differences in Charitable Giving. *International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing*, 16(4), 342-355.

ⁱⁱ See for example: Paynter, B. (2017). Philanthropy in 2017 Saw the Rise of Trump-Powered Giving. *Fast Company*. Retrieved from <https://www.fastcompany.com/40499097/philanthropy-in-2017-saw-the-rise-of-trump-powered-giving>; and Segedin, A. (2018). ‘Rage’ Giving Fueled Uptick in 2017 Fundraising. *The NonProfit Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.thenonproffitimes.com/news-articles/rage-giving-fueled-uptick-2017-fundraising/>

this purported increase in philanthropic contributions around the election was widely covered in media stories, few rigorous studies have been conducted to confirm this trend, particularly with regard to which demographic groups were most likely to give.

Literature Review

There is a rich history of giving time and financial resources in the United States. In 2017, \$410 billion was donated to U.S. charities. Nearly 80 percent of total giving came from individuals,ⁱⁱⁱ and inflation-adjusted donations by individuals have nearly doubled in the last 25 years (Giving USA Foundation, 2018). Long-running studies show that a majority of American households give to charity—56 percent in 2014, with the average donor household contributing around \$2,500 (Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2017). A large body of literature explains why people give to charity. Psychology tells us that individuals may donate out of pure altruism, or due to more selfish motives such as prestige, social pressure, or simply because giving feels good.^{iv} Economic conditions may also shape charitable giving. Experts have found that the Standard & Poors 500 Index (S&P 500), personal consumption, and gross domestic product influence giving, with one study even showing that S&P 500 performance accounts for almost 40 percent of annual variation in charitable contributions (List, 2011; List & Peysakhovich, 2011)

A smaller proportion of Americans donate time and resources to political candidates—or to influence election results. However, the share of the U.S. population that gives politically is growing—from 6 percent to 12 percent of adults in the last 25 years (Hughes, 2017). During the 2016 presidential election campaign, the two main candidates generated a combined \$2.4 billion (Center for Responsive Politics, 2017a). Individual donors contributed a large proportion of this amount, comprising 71 percent of Hillary Clinton’s and 40 percent of Donald Trump’s fundraising totals (Center for Responsive Politics, 2017b; C). Extensive research on why Americans give to political candidates or campaigns reveals two primary motivations. First, they may give to politics as a way of participating in the political process (Gordon, Hafer & Landa, 2007; Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo & Snyder, 2003; Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995). Second, they may give to affect policy outcomes (Gordon, Hafer & Landa, 2007; Aranson & Hinich, 1979; Grossman & Helpman, 2001; Hall & Wayman, 1990; Langbein, 1986; Snyder, 1990).

Scholarly research linking political giving with charitable giving is sparse. Descriptive studies have analyzed amounts donated for charitable and political purposes compared with demographic characteristics. One study found that, across general and high-net-worth-donor populations, households are more likely to give to both charitable and political organizations as the age of the head of household increases, the education level of the head of household

ⁱⁱⁱ This figure includes bequest giving.

^{iv} The literature on motivations for giving to charity is extensive. See for example: Becker, G.S. (1974). A Theory of Social Interactions. *Journal of Political Economy*, 82(6), 1063-1093, for a discussion of pure altruism and social pressure as motivations to give; Andreoni, J. (1989). Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence. *Journal of Political Economy*, 97(6), 1447-1458, on warm glow theory; and Hernandez-Murillo, R. & Roisman, D. (2005). The Economics of Charitable Giving: What Gives? *The Regional Economist*, Oct., 12-13, on prestige and for a wider discussion of giving motivations.

increases, and as household income rises.^v Additionally, the likelihood of giving to charitable organizations among these populations increases as the number of children under the age of 18 in a household rises (Giving USA Foundation, 2012). Other research shows that donors who gave to federal political campaigns in 2012 (a presidential election year) contributed approximately 1 percent more to the charitable organizations studied in 2012 than they did in 2011. Donors who did not contribute to such campaigns reduced their charitable giving by 2 percent from 2011 to 2012. These findings were consistent across all demographics traits measured, including head of household gender (O’Shaughnessy, 2016).

Beyond political giving, academic research examining the effects of one’s politics on charitable giving is even scarcer, with few studies directly addressing this topic. One study found that, among individuals with high moral identity internalization (i.e., the degree to which moral traits are central to a person’s self-concept), donations increase when there is alignment between one’s political identity and a charity’s moral foundations (Winterich, Zhang & Mittal, 2012). Another study found that lack of trust in government was an important predictor of certain types of charitable giving and all types of volunteering (Brooks & Lewis, 2001). While these studies illuminate personal characteristics and viewpoints that may have motivated Americans to donate to charity around a presidential election, the authors are not aware of any research on the impact of political events themselves on charitable giving, or how charitable giving in response to political events varies by gender. This study seeks to fill this gap in the literature.

Methodology and Empirical Framework

This study poses the following research questions:

1. Did charitable giving patterns change after Election Day (November 8, 2016)?
2. Did post-Election Day charitable giving vary by gender?
3. Did post-Election Day giving vary by type of charitable organization?

To test whether the election itself affected charitable giving, random-effect panel Ordinary Least Squares models were used, which controlled for date information. We estimated these models using both 2015 and 2016 donation information. We were particularly interested in 2015 data as it allows us to compare giving patterns in the context of a non-election year.

The baseline model can be expressed as:

$$y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PostElectionWeek_i + \mathbf{x}_{it}\boldsymbol{\gamma} + \theta t + \mathbf{c}_i + e_{it}$$

Where y_{it} is the outcome variable of interest, such as the natural log of average daily donation amounts for organization i at time t ; \mathbf{x}_{it} are controls for organizational characteristics, such as type, revenue, and year founded; t is the time effect; \mathbf{c}_i is the unobserved component, and e_{it} are

^v This study did not measure head of household gender.

the idiosyncratic errors. It is assumed that $E(c_i | x_{it}, PostElectionWeek_i) = 0$. Standard errors are clustered at the organizational level in all regressions.^{vi}

Data

The study uses data from Charity Navigator—a 501(c)(3) organization that evaluates U.S. nonprofits. Individuals visiting the organization’s website can find basic information on all U.S. charities, as well as evaluations of more than 9,000 nonprofits. They can also donate to these charities via the “Giving Basket” feature. Charity Navigator provided Giving Basket daily transaction data for this research, and merged the data with demographic information about donors and organizational data on the nonprofits. The data set contains information on the gifts themselves (e.g., amount, date, and time), donors (e.g., gender, income, and location), and organizations receiving the donations (e.g., EIN and subsector).

The full data set spanned the time period from October 29, 2015 to January 1, 2018; regression analyses that underlie the study’s findings used the full data set. Robustness checks were performed on several windows of time around Election Day to ensure the results were consistent. To focus on the impact of the 2016 presidential election, the data reflected in the proceeding figures and tables come from November 1, 2016 to November 15, 2016—one week before and after Election Day (November 8, 2016).

Analyses for this study used a subset of data from the top 131 charities, defined as any organization in the top 100 by either number or amount of donations. Robustness checks were also run with a larger set of charitable organizations and the results were similar. Charities in this subset were manually coded for political leaning. All organizations in the data set are 501(c)(3) public charities and are therefore limited in the advocacy or overt political actions they can take; the following categories are based on perceived political leaning only.

Categories included:

- Control: No identifiable political leaning (e.g. Alzheimer’s Association, Food for the Poor, American Red Cross)
- Conservative: A perceived conservative political leaning (e.g. Wounded Warriors Project, Operation Homefront)
- General progressive: A perceived progressive political leaning (e.g. the Greenpeace Fund, World Wildlife Fund)
- Relevant progressive: A perceived progressive political leaning that also has a direct connection to the 2016 election campaign (e.g. Planned Parenthood Federation, American Civil Liberties Union, National Immigration Law Center, Southern Poverty Law Center)

Data for the top 131 charitable organizations were collapsed in two different ways. First, all donations by organization by day were collapsed, so that each organization had one observation per day. The dependent variable used in most of the analyses shown is the log of total donations received by each organization on that day. Second, all donations by gender by organization by

^{vi} Since our data has relatively long panels (t is over 600), we also used other estimation methods that allow for more flexible correlation of errors. In general, models that allow for autoregressive errors produce bigger standard errors, but our results are still significant.

day were collapsed. In other words, donations from men and women donors were collapsed separately, so that each organization had two observations per day. This allowed for closer analysis by gender. See Table 1 below for summary statistics of the data.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

| | Mean | Standard Deviation |
|-------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|
| Average Daily Donation Amount | 118.57 | 1012.61 |
| % Female Donors | 51.46% | 0.43 |
| Average Size of Gift | 29.86 | 161.25 |
| Average Daily Number of Gifts | 0.90 | 5.10 |
| Political Category | | |
| % General Progressive | 19.23% | 0.39 |
| % Conservative | 9.28% | 0.29 |
| % Relevant Progressive | 8.46% | 0.28 |
| Type of Organizations | | |
| Arts | 1.67% | |
| Education | 1.67% | |
| Environments/Animals | 20.83% | |
| Health | 14.17% | |
| Human Services | 15.83% | |
| Other/Unknown | 45.83% | |
| Sample Size | 77,280 | |

Results


Descriptive Results

This study first examines trends in overall charitable giving during the week immediately leading up to and following the 2016 U.S. presidential election. While total dollars given to charity increased around Election Day 2016, this is not unusual and can be attributed to the regular rise in giving toward the end of the calendar year. There is no evidence that overall giving increased due to the 2016 election. Following the election, giving rose sharply three days after Election Day and continued to increase following a marked decline five days after the election (see Appendix Figure 1).

There is also no evidence of “rage giving”—or giving above and beyond what would be expected in a non-election year. In fact, giving to charity slowed in the days following the 2016 U.S. presidential election, compared to the level that would normally be expected based on previous non-election years (see Appendix Figure 2).

However, exploring giving by women and men reveals a clear gender difference. In comparison to men donors, women donors gave higher dollar amounts to charity in the week following the election. Figure 1 below shows that, while the trend in overall giving by men and women looks similar leading up to Election Day 2016, women’s giving increased much more than men’s giving post-election. During the week before the election, women gave an average of \$1,586 more than men to the top organizations in the data set. During the week after the election, this difference more than doubled to \$3,905.


Figure 1: Cumulative giving one week before and after Election Day 2016 by donor gender



An initial analysis of key characteristics of 501(c)(3) organizations receiving funding around the 2016 U.S. presidential election showed no significant effect on post-election donations. These characteristics, such as nonprofit subsector or size, did not impact whether a charity saw an increase in donations after Election Day.

However, Figure 2 below demonstrates that when organizations were classified according to perceived political leaning or particular relevance to the 2016 election cycle, significant differences appeared. While the trend in cumulative giving to all other organizations (i.e., every top nonprofit not classified as relevant progressive) appears relatively stable throughout the time period before and after Election Day, overall giving to relevant progressive nonprofits experienced a significant upward shift the week after Election Day.

Figure 2: Cumulative giving one week before and after Election Day 2016 by relevant progressive and all other nonprofits^{vii}




When examining giving to progressive organizations with particular relevance to the 2016 election cycle according to the gender of the donor, the increase in giving by women to these nonprofits is more significant than giving from all donors (both men and women). While women donated in greater amounts than men overall following the election, they also targeted relevant progressive charities with their contributions.

Figure 3 below illustrates this gender difference beginning around Election Day 2016. During the week leading up to the election, cumulative giving by men and women to relevant progressive nonprofits appears relatively comparable. In the week following the election, cumulative giving by women increases at a rate far surpassing that of men. During the week before the election, women gave an average of \$184 more than men to the top relevant progressive 501(c)(3) organizations in the data set. During the week after the election, this difference increased nearly six-fold to \$1,098.

^{vii} Note on Figure 2: Dual Y-axes are used to emphasize the difference in the cumulative giving trend between relevant progressive organizations and all other organizations, rather than the overall dollar amounts. Because relevant progressive organizations are a relatively small share of all organizations, they receive lower total charitable donations.

Figure 3: Cumulative giving to relevant progressive organizations one week before and after Election Day 2016 by donor gender



Regression Results

Table 1 presents results for the probability of organizations in the data set receiving a donation during the week following the 2016 U.S. presidential election. In general, nonprofits were 4% more likely to receive a donation on a daily basis during the week after the 2016 presidential election, holding other factors constant. Compared with all other types of organizations, relevant progressive nonprofits were 34% more likely to receive a donation the week following the 2016 election.

Table 1: Effect of 2016 presidential elections on donation incidence by week

| | Baseline- Excludes Gender | Relevant Progressive Organizations | Relevant Progressive Organizations Interaction |
|---|---------------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| Post-Election Week 1 | 0.040* (0.020) | 0.040* (0.020) | 0.012 (0.020) |
| Relevant Progressive Organizations | | -0.020 (0.053) | -0.024 (0.053) |
| Relevant Progressive Organizations x Post-Election Week 1 | | | 0.339** (0.057) |
| Constant | 2.495 (1.563) | 2.510 (1.569) | 2.510 (1.569) |

| | | | |
|--------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Observations | 76636 | 76636 | 76636 |
|--------------|-------|-------|-------|

~ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the organization level. Other controls not reported in the table include organizational characteristics such as type, revenue, and year founded, as well as a full sets of time effects.

Table 2 presents results for donation amounts to organizations in the data set during the week after the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The dependent variable in all columns is the natural log of donation amounts. Column 1 demonstrates that donation amounts did not change during the first week after the 2016 presidential election, holding other factors constant. Column 2 shows similar results. However, column 3 reveals that relevant progressive organizations received almost 200% more money during the week following the 2016 election than all other types of organizations, holding other factors constant.

In the columns with gender, we find that, conditional on giving, donation amounts dropped substantially during the week after the election, with a 40% to 60% decline across models. The results demonstrate that women gave more money—between 4% and 5% more than men—across all time periods. The interaction terms of female and post-election week indicate that women gave between 38% and 39% more than men more during the week following the election. Finally, the three-way interaction term reveals that women gave substantially more money to relevant progressive organizations than men during the week after the election.

Table 2: Effect of 2016 presidential election on donation amounts by week (log donations in dollars)

| | Baseline-Excludes Gender | Relevant Progressive Organizations | Relevant Progressive Organizations Interaction | Baseline-Includes Gender | Interaction | Relevant Progressive Organizations Interaction | Three-Way Interaction |
|---|--------------------------|------------------------------------|--|--------------------------|---------------------|--|-----------------------|
| Post-Election Week 1 | -0.073 (0.092) | -0.073 (0.092) | -0.236* (0.093) | -0.377** (0.062) | -0.574** (0.085) | -0.651** (0.090) | -0.617** (0.093) |
| Female | | | | 0.054** (0.019) | 0.046* (0.019) | 0.046* (0.019) | 0.037~ (0.020) |
| Female x Post-Election Week 1 | | | | | 0.382** (0.092) | 0.386** (0.092) | 0.321** (0.101) |
| Relevant Progressive Organizations | | -0.073 (0.285) | -0.094 (0.283) | | | -0.088 (0.130) | -0.139 (0.130) |
| Relevant Progressive Organizations x Post-Election Week 1 | | | 1.945** (0.361) | | | 0.517** (0.199) | 0.292 (0.222) |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Female x Relevant Progressive Organizations x Post- Election Week 1 | | | | | | | 0.450* (0.204) |
| | | | | | | | |
| Constant | 11.084 (7.780) | 11.136 (7.811) | 11.138 (7.811) | 2.063 (3.190) | 2.071 (3.184) | 2.135 (3.208) | 2.136 (3.209) |
| Observations | 76636 | 76636 | 76636 | 26258 | 26258 | 26258 | 26258 |

$\sim p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the organization level. Other controls not reported in the table include organizational characteristics such as type, revenue, and year founded, as well as a full sets of time effects. Columns with gender controls only include days with positive donation amounts.

Robustness Checks

To test the robustness of our results, we conducted additional analyses with various functional forms and specifications.

Appendix Table 1 presents results with coefficients for each day during the 7-day period before and after the 2016 U.S. presidential election. On most days prior to the election, women gave less than men, and relevant progressive organizations received less money than non-relevant progressive organizations. These results reversed following the election: On most days during the week after the election, women gave more than men, and relevant progressive organizations received more money than non-relevant progressive organizations.

Appendix Table 2 presents results controlling for time trends specific to organization type, and the results are very similar to those in Table 2 above. Appendix Table 3 presents results for the median regression, which show that the median donation amount was \$70 less during the week following the election. However, the median donation amount to relevant progressive organizations was \$50 more than all other types of organizations.

Appendix Table 4 presents results for giving to women and girls causes. Similar to Table 2 above, giving amounts declined the week after the election. Giving to women and girls' causes also decreased, but at a lower rate. On the other hand, women increased their giving to women and girls' causes the week following the election.

Finally, in Appendix Table 5, we controlled for a hypothetical 2015 election. The results are very similar to those in Table 2 above.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study contributes to scholarly research on the economic and social outcomes of political events in a unique way by analyzing changes in charitable giving around the 2016 U.S. presidential election. In particular, the paper provides new insight on gender differences in individuals' philanthropic responses to political events. Examining variations in charitable giving by donor gender leads to a more complete understanding of philanthropic phenomena since research has shown that women and men demonstrate different patterns in their giving. Overall, our analyses show no evidence for increased charitable giving due to the 2016 U.S. presidential election; if anything, the election may have depressed giving. However, gender differences are apparent. Women donated in greater amounts than men following Election Day, and they appeared to target relevant progressive charities with their giving. Although the analyses for this study cannot determine the exact reason for these difference, previous research points to some possible explanations.

While this study is unique in its analysis of the impact of political events themselves on charitable giving, the results are consistent with existing research on the effects of individuals' personal politics on their philanthropy. Winterich, Zhang, and Mittal found that, among individuals with high moral identity internalization (i.e., the degree to which moral traits are central to a person's self-concept), donations increase when there is alignment between one's political identity and a charity's moral foundations (2012). Research has shown that women have more strongly internalized moral identities than men (Kennedy, Kray, & Ku, 2017), which could increase the likelihood that they ensure the charities to which they donate are aligned with their political persuasions, especially following a major event like the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

This study also aligns with the finding of Brooks and Lewis that lack of trust in government is an important predictor of certain types of charitable giving and all types of volunteering (2001). The Pew Research Center has demonstrated a growing gender gap in Americans' level of optimism about the country's future (2017). While men's confidence in the future of the U.S. increased by 6 percentage points between October 2015 and April 2017, women's confidence in the future of the country declined by 14 percentage points during the same period. This, combined with the wide gender gap in voting during the election, could have led women to be more distrusting of the new government after the 2016 presidential election, increasing their likelihood to give.

It is important to note that the data set used for this study is limited to donations given via Charity Navigator's website, which represent a small portion of U.S. charitable donations and is not necessarily representative of all donations. Since the data set is comprised of online donations, the findings may not be generalizable for all charitable giving. Additionally, this study is limited in that it only examines the impact of one presidential election year—2016—which was unique in many ways.

To generate greater knowledge about how political events like elections impact charitable giving more broadly, further research should include data from a number of years, as well as election cycles with a variety of outcomes. For example, it is uncertain if progressive nonprofits would have seen the same rise in giving, or whether women donors would have increased their giving to a similar extent, if the outcome of the 2016 election had been different. Further research

should also include data on donations made through a variety of methods (e.g., telephone, text, mail, online) to be more representative of overall charitable giving in the U.S.

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Appendix

Figure 1: Total giving one week before and after Election Day 2016 (all giving and by donor gender)





Figure 2: Cumulative giving one week before and after Election Day 2016 and hypothetical Election Day 2015^{viii}



^{viii} Note on Figure 2: Between 2015 and 2016, Charity Navigator experienced significant growth in the amount of donations processed through its website. Dual Y-axes are used to emphasize the difference in cumulative giving trends between these years, rather than overall dollar amounts.

Table 1: Effect of 2016 presidential election on donation amounts by day (log donations in dollars)

| | Baseline-Excludes Gender | Relevant Progressive Organizations | Relevant Progressive Organizations Interaction | Baseline-Includes Gender | Interaction | Relevant Progressive Organizations Interaction |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------|---|---|---------------------------------|---------------------|---|
| Post-Election Week Day 1 | -0.549** (0.173) | -0.549** (0.173) | -0.720** (0.182) | -0.698** (0.158) | -0.744** (0.163) | -0.744** (0.163) |
| Post-Election Week Day 2 | -0.058 (0.194) | -0.058 (0.194) | -0.225 (0.205) | -1.010** (0.148) | -1.056** (0.164) | -1.056** (0.164) |
| Post-Election Week Day 3 | 0.357~ (0.191) | 0.357~ (0.192) | 0.216 (0.205) | -0.402* (0.158) | -0.527** (0.148) | -0.527** (0.148) |
| Post-Election Week Day 4 | -0.545** (0.185) | -0.545** (0.185) | -0.748** (0.194) | -0.729** (0.217) | -0.876** (0.233) | -0.876** (0.233) |
| Post-Election Week Day 5 | -0.769** (0.179) | -0.769** (0.179) | -1.022** (0.185) | -0.906** (0.198) | -1.022** (0.240) | -1.022** (0.240) |
| Post-Election Week Day 6 | -0.001 (0.200) | -0.001 (0.200) | -0.014 (0.210) | -0.397* (0.168) | -0.344* (0.171) | -0.344* (0.171) |
| Post-Election Week Day 7 | -0.520* (0.204) | -0.520* (0.204) | -0.714** (0.210) | -0.578* (0.262) | -0.714** (0.262) | -0.714** (0.262) |
| | | | | | | |
| Pre-Election Week Day 1 | -1.326** (0.198) | -1.326** (0.198) | -1.271** (0.208) | -0.281 (0.283) | -0.175 (0.273) | -0.175 (0.273) |
| Pre-Election Week Day 2 | -0.432* (0.193) | -0.432* (0.193) | -0.583** (0.205) | -0.977** (0.168) | -0.987** (0.169) | -0.987** (0.169) |
| Pre-Election Week Day 3 | -1.586** (0.188) | -1.586** (0.188) | -1.503** (0.198) | 0.009 (0.338) | 0.111 (0.333) | 0.111 (0.333) |
| Pre-Election Week Day 4 | -0.777** (0.182) | -0.777** (0.182) | -0.722** (0.191) | -1.116** (0.203) | -1.036** (0.181) | -1.036** (0.181) |
| Pre-Election Week Day 5 | -0.979** (0.186) | -0.979** (0.186) | -0.865** (0.189) | -0.652** (0.192) | -0.653** (0.192) | -0.653** (0.192) |
| Pre-Election Week Day 6 | -1.306** (0.187) | -1.306** (0.187) | -1.226** (0.194) | -0.358 (0.473) | -0.360 (0.473) | -0.360 (0.473) |
| Pre-Election Week Day 7 | -1.322** (0.198) | -1.322** (0.198) | -1.270** (0.208) | -1.285** (0.184) | -1.275** (0.189) | -1.275** (0.189) |
| | | | | | | |
| Female x Post-Election | | | | | 0.286 (0.209) | 0.280 (0.211) |

| | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|--|--|--|---------------------|---------------------|
| Week Day 1 | | | | | | |
| Female x Post-Election Week Day 2 | | | | | 0.995** (0.210) | 0.968** (0.206) |
| Female x Post-Election Week Day 3 | | | | | 0.440~ (0.227) | 0.447* (0.226) |
| Female x Post-Election Week Day 4 | | | | | 0.143 (0.249) | 0.181 (0.258) |
| Female x Post-Election Week Day 5 | | | | | 0.099 (0.240) | 0.153 (0.257) |
| Female x Post-Election Week Day 6 | | | | | 0.074 (0.213) | 0.058 (0.212) |
| Female x Post-Election Week Day 7 | | | | | 0.513 (0.324) | 0.489 (0.320) |
| | | | | | | |
| Female x Pre-Election Week Day 1 | | | | | -0.127 (0.345) | -0.199 (0.342) |
| Female x Pre-Election Week Day 2 | | | | | 0.784** (0.207) | 0.786** (0.205) |
| Female x Pre-Election Week Day 3 | | | | | -1.004** (0.369) | -1.108** (0.363) |
| Female x Pre-Election Week Day 4 | | | | | -0.025 (0.204) | -0.048 (0.196) |
| Female x Pre-Election Week Day 5 | | | | | -0.620* (0.300) | -0.679* (0.303) |
| Female x Pre-Election Week Day 6 | | | | | -0.444 (0.503) | -0.355 (0.496) |

| | | | | | | |
|---|--|--|--------------------|--|-------------------|--------------------|
| Female x Pre-Election Week Day 7 | | | | | 0.992* (0.397) | 0.994* (0.397) |
| | | | | | | |
| Post-Election Week Day 1 x Relevant Progressive Organizations | | | 2.038** (0.507) | | | 0.323 (0.296) |
| Post-Election Week Day 2 x Relevant Progressive Organizations | | | 1.989** (0.607) | | | 0.373 (0.309) |
| Post-Election Week Day 3 x Relevant Progressive Organizations | | | 1.674* (0.734) | | | 0.901* (0.361) |
| Post-Election Week Day 4 x Relevant Progressive Organizations | | | 2.407** (0.599) | | | 0.838~ (0.431) |
| Post-Election Week Day 5 x Relevant Progressive Organizations | | | 3.010** (0.350) | | | 0.491 (0.318) |
| Post-Election Week Day 6 x Relevant Progressive Organizations | | | 0.155 (0.784) | | | -0.432 (0.441) |
| Post-Election Week Day 7 x Relevant Progressive Organizations | | | 2.303** (0.819) | | | 1.014** (0.354) |
| | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| Pre-Election Week Day 1 x Relevant Progressive Organizations | | | -0.651 (0.479) | | | -1.011** (0.251) |
| Pre-Election Week Day 2 x Relevant Progressive Organizations | | | 1.796** (0.573) | | | 0.064 (0.217) |
| Pre-Election Week Day 3 x Relevant Progressive Organizations | | | -0.977** (0.325) | | | -2.363** (0.326) |
| Pre-Election Week Day 4 x Relevant Progressive Organizations | | | -0.657 (0.484) | | | -0.963~ (0.510) |
| Pre-Election Week Day 5 x Relevant Progressive Organizations | | | -1.356** (0.438) | | | 1.300** (0.235) |
| Pre-Election Week Day 6 x Relevant Progressive Organizations | | | -0.943* (0.415) | | | -2.208** (0.154) |
| Pre-Election Week Day 7 x Relevant Progressive Organizations | | | -0.614 (0.508) | | | -0.178 (0.645) |
| | | | | | | |
| Constant | 10.948 (7.779) | 11.000 (7.810) | 11.002 (7.811) | 2.005 (3.175) | 1.992 (3.172) | 2.066 (3.204) |
| Observations | 76636 | 76636 | 76636 | 26258 | 26258 | 26258 |

Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at organization level.

~ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 2: Effect of 2016 presidential election on donation amounts controlled for specific time trends by organization type (log donations in dollars)

| | Baseline-Excludes Gender | Relevant Progressive Organizations | Relevant Progressive Organizations Interaction | Baseline-Includes Gender | Interaction | Relevant Progressive Organizations Interaction |
|---|---------------------------------|---|---|---------------------------------|------------------------|---|
| Post-Election Week 1 | -0.026 (0.093) | -0.026 (0.093) | -0.189* (0.093) | -0.202** (0.064) | -0.403** (0.088) | -0.481** (0.092) |
| Female | | | | 0.053** (0.019) | 0.045* (0.019) | 0.045* (0.019) |
| Female x Post-Election Week 1 | | | | | 0.389** (0.092) | 0.394** (0.092) |
| Relevant Progressive Organizations | | -0.073 (0.285) | -0.094 (0.283) | | | -0.098 (0.132) |
| Relevant Progressive x Post-Election Week 1 | | | 1.945** (0.361) | | | 0.528** (0.197) |
| Constant | -253.948** (22.324) | -253.896** (22.353) | -253.957** (22.355) | -482.793** (25.600) | -482.958** (25.614) | -483.122** (25.626) |
| Observations | 76636 | 76636 | 76636 | 26258 | 26258 | 26258 |

Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at organization level.

~ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Median regression on donation amounts (log donations in dollars)

| | Baseline- Excludes Gender | Relevant Progressive Organizations | Relevant Progress Organizations Interaction |
|---|----------------------------------|---|--|
| Post-Election Week 1 | -70.000** (9.725) | -70.000** (9.726) | -70.000** (9.906) |
| Relevant Progressive Organizations | | 0.001 (3.844) | -0.001 (4.042) |
| Relevant Progressive Organizations x Post-Election Week 1 | | | 50.000** (10.728) |

| | | | |
|--------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Constant | -80.000 (102.050) | -80.000 (102.050) | -80.000 (102.053) |
| Observations | 22396 | 22396 | 22396 |

Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at organization level.

~ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Effect of 2016 presidential election on donation amounts to women and girls' (WAG) causes by week (log donations in dollars)

| | WAG- Excludes Gender | WAG Interaction | WAG- Includes Gender | WAG Interaction |
|--|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Female | | | 0.0543*** (0.0190) | 0.0507*** (0.0196) |
| Post-Election Week 1 | -0.0731 (0.0932) | -0.136 (0.0938) | -0.375*** (0.0618) | -0.587*** (0.0942) |
| Female x Post-Election Week 1 | | | | 0.341*** (0.0996) |
| Hypothetical Post-Election Week 1 2015 | -0.00524 (0.0689) | -0.00277 (0.0758) | 0.0319 (0.0701) | 0.0329 (0.118) |
| Female x Hypothetical Post-Election Week 1 2015 | | | | -0.000133 (0.143) |
| Women and Girls Causes | -0.296 (0.191) | -0.302 (0.189) | -0.198** (0.0935) | -0.188** (0.0925) |
| Female x Women and Girls Causes | | | | -0.0375 (0.0726) |
| Post-Election Week 1 x Women and Girls Causes | | 0.578 (0.443) | | 0.121 (0.189) |
| Female x Post-Election Week 1 x Women and Girls Causes | | | | 0.303* (0.181) |
| Hypothetical Post-Election Week 1 2015 x Women and Girls Causes | | -0.0226 (0.176) | | 0.280* (0.158) |
| Female x Hypothetical Post-Election Week 1 2015 x Women and Girls Causes | | | | -0.412** (0.161) |
| Constant | 10.10 (7.645) | 10.10 (7.645) | 1.401 (3.131) | 1.413 (3.125) |

| | | | | |
|----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Observations | 76,636 | 76,636 | 26,258 | 26,258 |
| Number of EINs | 119 | 119 | 237 | 237 |

Table 5: Effect of 2016 presidential election on donation amounts by week controlled for hypothetical 2015 election (log donations in dollars)

| | Baseline-Excludes Gender | Relevant Progressive Organizations | Relevant Progressive Organizations Interaction | Baseline-Includes Gender | Interaction | Relevant Progressive Organizations Interaction |
|--|--------------------------|------------------------------------|--|--------------------------|-----------------------|--|
| Female | | | | 0.0536*** (0.0190) | 0.0461** (0.0190) | 0.0373* (0.0201) |
| Post-Election Week 1 | -0.0731 (0.0932) | -0.0731 (0.0932) | -0.236** (0.0943) | -0.375*** (0.0617) | -0.572*** (0.0849) | -0.615*** (0.0929) |
| Female x Post-Election Week 1 | | | | | 0.382*** (0.0914) | 0.320*** (0.101) |
| Hypothetical Post-Election Week 1 2015 | -0.00524 (0.0689) | -0.00524 (0.0689) | 0.00314 (0.0743) | 0.0316 (0.0701) | 0.0551 (0.110) | 0.0428 (0.110) |
| Female x Hypothetical Post-Election Week 1 2015 | | | | | -0.0365 (0.131) | -0.0197 (0.132) |
| Relevant Progressive | | -0.0732 (0.285) | -0.0932 (0.284) | | | -0.140 (0.131) |
| Female x Relevant Progressive | | | | | | 0.105** (0.0506) |
| Post-Election Week 1 x Relevant Progressive Organizations | | | 1.944*** (0.360) | | | 0.292 (0.221) |
| Female x Post Election Week 1 x Relevant Progressive Organizations | | | | | | 0.449** (0.204) |

| | | | | | | |
|--|------------------|------------------|--------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Hypothetical Post-Election Week 1 2015 x Relevant Progressive Organizations | | | -0.0996 (0.157) | | | 0.228 (0.789) |
| Female x Hypothetical Post-Election Week 1 2015 x Relevant Progressive Organizations | | | | | | -0.303 (0.161) |
| | | | | | | |
| Constant | 11.08 (7.781) | 11.14 (7.812) | 11.14 (7.812) | 2.066 (3.191) | 2.075 (3.185) | 2.141 (3.209) |
| Observations | 76,636 | 76,636 | 76,636 | 26,258 | 26,258 | 26,258 |
| Number of EINs | 119 | 119 | 119 | 237 | 237 | 237 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Additional controls used but not shown: organization revenue size, year of founding, NTEE Category, day of the week of donation, month of donation, year of donation

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1